UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

9-8-2008

Eby v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 36568

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Eby v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 36568" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2337.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2337

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

F

DANIEL LEE EBY,

1
1

)

VS.

1

.

S. Ct. No 34179 .

-

STATE OF IDAHO,
RespondentiRespond

-----A

OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the District Court-of the Flrst Judicial Dlstrlct of the State of Idaho
In and For the County of Kootenai
HONORABLE JOHN PATRICK LUSTER
District Judge

I

I

Dennis Benjamin
ISBA# 4199
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 343-1000

Lawrence Wasden
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
(208) 334-2400

Attorneys for Appellant

Attorneys for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS

..

I . Table of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

I1. Statement of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A . Nature of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
B . Procedural History and Statement of Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

I11. Issues Presented for Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
IV . Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

A . The District Court Erred in Failing lo Set Aside the Order of Dismissal
Pursuant to Daniel's Pro Se Rule 60(b) Motioll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
B . Upon Remand. the District Court Should be Ordered to Appoint New Competent
Cou~lsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
V . Conclusion

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)

12,23

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) ........................................................................................
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)

12
11,23

STATE CASES
Castle v. FIays, 131 Idaho 373, 957 P.2d 351 (1998) ..........................

15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21

Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 894,908 P.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1995)

24

Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685, 905 P.2d 86 (1995)

14

Marshall v. Enns, 39 Idaho 744,230 P.46 (1924)

19

McGloon v. Gwynn, 140 Idaho 727, 100 P.3d 62 1 (2004) ................... .
.
.
...........................

23

Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 177 P.3d 400 (Ct. App. 2008)

10

State v. Bettwieser, 143 Idaho 482, 149 P.3d 857 (Ct. App. 2006) ...................................... 21, 23
State v. Eby, 136 Idaho 534, 37 P.3d 625 (2001)

1

OTHER
Art. 1, 5 13, U.S. Const. Amend. 5 ................... .
.
.
.................................................................

23
24

3, 10, 14, 17, 20, 21
Rule 59(b)
Rule 60
Rule 60(b)

20
15, 16

...................................................................................................... 17, 19, 20, 21, 23

11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature ofthe Case.
This is an appeal from the denial o f a motion to set aside ail order dismissing a petition
for post-conviction reliei: Clerk's Record (CR) 163.

B. Procedural Historv and Statement of Facts.
On January 3 1, 2002, Appellant Daniel Eby filed a pro se petition for post-conviction
relief after a direct appeal resulted in a grant of partial relief. CR 14, State v. Eby, 136 Idaho 534,
536,37 P.3d 625,627 (2001).
Daniel had been convicted of first degree murder, coilspiracy to commit robbery and
attempted robbery for offenses occurring when he was 18 years old. In the direct appeal, the
Court of Appeals'held that his statement to the police, "I've got an attorney" did not invoke his
right to counsel so as to require termination of his interrogation, that the admissioil of hearsay
statements by a co-defendant who did not testify at trial was error, but that the error was
harmless, that a threats and menaces jury instruction was not warranted, and that the conviction
for attempted robbery merged with the conviction for felony murder. Id.
Daniel raised two issues in his pro se petition: 1) that he had received ineffective
assistance of counsel; and 2) that the prosecutor andlor state had withheld favorable information
from the defense. CR 15.
Daniel filed a motion for appointment of counsel concurrently with his petition. CR 28.
And, on the same day, the District Court appointed the Kootenai County Public Defender to the
case. CR 31.
The state filed its answer to the pro se petition asserting that it failed to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. CR 35. And, four days later, on February 11,2002, a notice of
substitution of counsel was filed giving notice that the case had now been assigned to conflict
counsel Jeffery Smith. CR 37.
On June 27, 2002, Daniel wrote to the District Court stating that Smith had oilly spoken
with him once and would not accept his phone calls or answer his letters. Daniel said that he still
had not been informed as to whether a court date had been set on his petition and he wondered if
there was a motion or "any type of paper" he could file to get an attorney to actually help him and
keep him informed of the status of the case. He also asked the Court to please let him know if a
court date had been set or if anything else had happened in the case. Ex. Letter dated 6127102.'

h response the Court wrote back saying that it understood that new counsel was being
assigned and that the judge would review the case in another 30 days to be sure that Daniel's
concerns were being addressed. Ex. Letter dated 7/12!02.2
On August 12,2002, six months after Smith had been appointed, the District Court issued
its first Notice of Proposed Dismissal pursuant to Idaho Civil Rule of Procedure 40(c) giving
Daniel until August 29,2002, to file a written affidavit setting forth facts to justify retention of
the case. A handwritten note on the bottom of the notice says that per John Adams, new counsel
was to be forthcoming and that the case would not be dismissed. CR 39.
On September 1,2002, Daniel again wrote to the Court saying that he still had not heard

A packet entitled "Exhibits Letters between Plaintiff and Judge Luster & Public
Defender" is included in the record on appeal. Because the packet contains no page numbers, the
letters will be cited here by date.
I

Later, the District Court stated, ". . . Mr. Sinith basically didn't do anything in the case,
and I think he had some probleins with the Bar Association." Tr. 19.

if he had been appointed new counsel and was wondering what was happening in the case. Ex.
Letter 9/1/02. On September 10, 2002, the Court wrote back to Daniel and stated that there had
been a delay in his representation but current arrangements were under way to obtain qualified
counsel and aslted Daniel to contact the Court again in 30 days if he still had not been contacted
by counsel. Ex. Letters 9110102.
On October 8,2002, with no notice of appearance by any new counsel having been filed,
the state filed its motion for summary judgment. The state's motion simply stated that it sought
summary judgment because "Petitioner has not alleged or shown any prejudice and mere
allegations are insufficient for proper Post Conviction filing." CR 41.
On October 11,2002, Daniel wrote to the Court again saying that he still had not been
contacted by counsel. Ex. Letters 10111102. The Court responded with a letter telling Daniel that
Rolf Kehne had been appointed. Ex. Letters 10128102. And, on October 21,2002, Kehne filed a
notice of appearance. CR 42.
For the next six months, nothi~lgwas filed in the case. Then on April 30, 2003, the Court
filed a second notice of a proposed dismissal for inactivity under Civil Rule 40(c) giving Kehne
until May 19, 2003, to file an affidavit setting forth specific facts to justify retention of the case.
However, this notice was incorrectly addressed and apparently was not delivered to Kelme. CR
46.
On May 27, 2003, a third notice of proposed dismissal under Rule 40(c) was issued
giving Kehne until June 16, 2003, to submit an affidavit justifying retention. CR 48. And, this
time, on June 16,2003, Kehne filed a response setting out work he had already done on the case
and proposing a timetable for the remaining work including his intent to file an amended petition

by September 15, 2003, and dispositive motions by October 15,2003. CR 49. Two days later,
the Court issued its order retaining the case. CR 59
On December l I , 2003, Daniel wrote to ICehne:

Jin writing to see what the status of my case is and if any court dates have been set
yet.

I was also wondering iT(208) 939-2023 is the only number I can try to call you
collect at? The reason I'm asking is because I've been trying to reach you at that
number for about 40r5 months during business hours with no luck.
Could you please write and let me know how the case is going and if any court
dates have been set.
Thank you for your time.
CR 114 (errors in original).
The record contains no indication of any response to this letter.
The dates for action set out in Kehne's prior response to the notice of proposed dismissal
came and went with nothing being filed in the District Court. And, 011 December 15, 2003, three
months after the date upon which Kehne bad stated he would file an amended petition, the Court
issued its fourth notice of proposed dismissal for inactivity. CR 60.
ry
Kehne filed a response and affidavit in which he stated, "Owing to
On J a ~ ~ u a2,2004,
the press of other cases, Petitioner's counsel bas not been able to keep the schedule proposed in
the June, 2003, RESPONSE." Kehne set out the work he had completed in the prior six months
and set out a new proposed timetable which included filing an amended petition on March 15,
2004. CR 62.
Again, the Court retained the case. CR 71

By July 12,2004, Kehne still had not filed anything in the case and the District Court

issued its fifth notice of proposed dismissal for inactivity. CR 72. Kehne responded stating,
"Petitioner has largely completed his review, investigation, research and analysis of postconviction issues, and can file an amended petition shortly." He proposed filing the amended
petition on October 4, 2004. CR 74.

In the response, Kehne outlined the issues he intended to raise in the amended petition.
These included a claim that trial counsel had been operating under a conflict of interest because
they worked in the same office as counsel of a co-defendant; a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel at sentencing in failing to properly litigate the relative culpability of Danieland the codefendants; and a claim that Daniel was entitled to resentencing as at the time of sentencing, the
District Court did not have the Court of Appeals' liolding that the co-defendant's hearsay was
inadmissible and that the conviction had to be treated as felony murder and not premeditated
murder. CR 74.
Again, the Court retained the case. CR 87.
By February 8, 2005, nothing had been filed in the case. Now, seven months after the last
order of retention and two years and four months after Kehne entered his notice of appearance,
the District Court issued its sixth notice of proposed dismissal for inactivity. CR 89.
Kehne filed a response stating that he had completed the interviews for his investigation
and was "ready to file a Petition." All that was needed was for Kehne to take the petition to
Daniel so that Daniel could sign it. Kehne stated that the amended petition would be filed on or
before March 4, 2005, or he would file another declaration explaining the delay. CR 92.
March 4,2005, anived and nothing was filed. And so, on June 14,2005, the District
Court dismissed the case pursuant to the sixth notice of proposed dismissal filed on Februaly 3,

Unfortunately, the order of dismissal was not served on Daniel. Rather, it was faxed to
Kehne. CR 97.3
It had now been three years and five months since counsel had been appointed to
represent Daniel, yet no amended petition or any other substantive pleading had ever been filed.
On August 9,2005, Daniel wrote to the Court:
My name is Daniel Lee Eby #56649 I was wondering if you could tell me the
Status of my Post-Conviction CASE No. Cv02-674 And if any kind of court dates
or dead lines have been set in regards to my case. thank you for your time and
help.

Ex. Letter dated 819105 (errors in original)
That same day, Daniel wrote to Icehne:
This is Daniel Lee Eby #56540 Irn writing in reguards to my post-collviction and
if any court dates or dead lines have been set reguarding my Post-Conviction?
As of today's date I haven't been able to get in contact with you I tried to call your
office (208) 939-2023 but that number has been disconnected. It gives you a new
number. (208) 376 4006 but as of today I have been unable to get in contact with
anybody or even an answering machine.
Could you please get in contact with me some how so that I can find out the status
of my Post-Conviction. thank you
CR 118 (errors in original)
Upon finally receiving notice that his case had been dismissed, Daniel wrote to the Court:
On 8-17-2005 I received a letter back from the clerk of the court stating that my
Post-Conviction was Dismissed on June-14-2005
Three years later, on June 27, 2008, Rolf Kehne was suspended from the practice of law
for one year with all but 90 days withheld based in part upon his coilduct in this case. After the
90 day actual suspension, Kehne will be required to serve a two year probationary period. See
Notice of Suspensioil/Public Censure, The Advocate, August 2008, pg. 9.

Could you please check and see if Mr. Rolf Kehne has filed any kind of motions
reguarding this matter, Like an Appeal or Motion for a rehearing?

1havc bccn unablc to get in contact with Mr. ICehne for the last couple of months
and today is the first time that I find out that my Post-Conviction was Dismissed
on 6-14-2005 I don't understand why I never received notice of this from the court
house or my Attorney.
Attached is a motion for a rehearing reguarding the Dismissal of my PostConviction Case # CV-2002-0674 And a Not~ceof Appeal reguarding the
dismissal of said Post-Conviction. If Mr. Kehne has filed any of these said
Motions could I please receive copies of them, If he has already filed these
motions already please disreguard the ones I've enclosed. Thank You.
Ex. Letter dated 8/17/05 (errors in original).
Daniel's Notice of Appeal stated:
Notice is hereby given that DANEL LEE EBY # 56540, Defendant in the above
named case, appeals from the order of Dismissal of STATE Post-Conviction.
Ex. Notice oCAppeal dated 8117105
Daniel's Notice for rehearing stated:
Notice is hereby given that DANIEL LEE EBY # 56540, Defendant is the above
named case, Asks for a rehearing on the OIWER OF DISMISSALIRETENTION
OF STATE POST-CONVICTION.
Ex. Notice for Rehearing dated 8/17/05 (errors in original).
Even though these documents were sent to the Court along with a certificate of service,
they appear as exhibits on appeal and are not file stamped or entered into the Register of Actions.
See Record on Appeal
About two weeks later, on September 1,2005, Daniel wrote again to the Court:
To: The Honerable Judge John Patrick Luster,
I sent you a cot~pleof motions on 8-17-05 I was informed by another inmate that
I've got to send that kid of stuff to the clerk of the court and that I also have to

send a copy of thein to the State I was unaware of this, Could you please direguard
the Notice of Appeal as I was informed that I need to file that at the end of all this.
as of today I placed a copy of the NOTICE for a rehearing on order of
Dismissal/Retention State Post-Conviction and a Copy of the AFFIDAVIT in
support for the Motion for rehearing in the mail to the attorney general criminal
division and a copy of these to the clerk of the court im sony for all these
mistakes I just don't know what im doing when it comes to law.
Is there any way that I could have a phone hearing reguarding this motion and get
a hearing date and time so I can have a chance to prepare to the best of my ability
with my lack of knowledge in the law.

I thank you for your time.
CR 98 (errors in original)
This letter was followed five days later, on September 6, 2005, with a pro se notice for a
rehearing on order of dismissal/retention and brief in support of review. In the briec Daniel
stated that he was unaware of the pending dismissal of the post-conviction. He also set out
specific claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and destruction of evidence by the
investigating detective. At the end of his brief, Daniel asked for relief in the form of 1)
assumption of jurisdiction; 2) reversal of the dismissal of the post conviction and remand for
further proceedings; 3) grant of an evidentiary hearing; 4) remand for a new trial; 5) appointment
of counsel; and 6) all other appropriate relief. CR 99, 108
Daniel supported his briefwith an affidavit. In the affidavit, he stated:

1. Rolf Kehne Never sent me notice that the court was going to dismiss my PostConviction for lack of inactivity.
2. If I would of known the court was going to dismiss my Post-Conviction I
would have opposed the dismissal.
3. I spoke to Mr. Rolf Kehne around May 2005 and everything was fine with my
Post-Conviction.

4. Mr. Rolf Kelx~e'sConduct has denied me Due Process of law
CR 107 (errors in original).
On September 16, 2005, Daniel wrote to the clerk of the court asking about the status of
his motion, brief, and affidavit. CR 110.
Then, on October 3, 2005, Daniel filed a pro se motion for the appointment of new
counsel. In the motion, Daniel cites Kehne's failure to communicate with him or work on the
case and his own limited competence in representing himself. CR 111. Daniel attached copies of
several letters he had sent to Kehne over the years in attempts to communicate with Kehne and to
get Kehne to help him. CR 112-119.
On November 17,2005, the Court appointed new counsel to represent Daniel. CR 120.
And, on December 16,2005, Daniel wrote to the Court asking whether the Court could tell him
the name of his new counsel as no one had yet contacted him. Ex. Letter dated 12/16/05.
On January 17, 2006, Daniel wrote again lo the Court, again asking if the Court could tell
him the name of his counsel because no one had yet contacted him. Ex. Letter dated 1/17/06.
And, again, he wrote on February 9,2006, still having not been contacted by counsel. Daniel
closed that letter: "I'm concerned about possibly being penalized for missing a dead line due to
the fact I've yet to be contacted by counsel. Are there any dead lines I should be aware of? 1
Thank You for Your Time." Ex. Letter dated 2/9/06.
Finally, on March 7, 2006, a notice ofsubstitution of counsel was entered by Linda
Payne. CR 121. And, on March 15,2006, Payne wrote to Daniel telling him that she planned to
begin work on his case in April and that it would take "many, many hours to read and digest
everything that went on in your case." Ex. Letter dated 3/15/06.

On June 6, 2006, Daniel wrote again to the Court stating that he was worried about a
letter be had received from Payne and asking if the Court could inform him as to what sort of
time deadlines applied to his case. CR 125. In her letter to Daniel, Payne had written:

The status of your case is in abeyance. There is no court date. I spoke with Judge
Luster about your case approximately a month ago, and (since I have another
murder trial upcoming with him) he is not pushing your case to hearing. He is
giving me time to work on the current murder case and yours before he sets a
hearing.
When I get time I will read your file and give you an analysis. As I previously
said, the strongest issue in your case is that your sentence is grossly
disproportionate. I seriously doubt that you would get any less than 10 years. We
have plcnty of time to adequately deal with your case.
CR 126. (Daniel's concerns were quite justified as the status of his case was not "in abeyance"
but rather dismissed at this time and as the question of whether a sentence is excessive is not one
raised in a post conviction proceeding.)
which can be successf~~lly
On June 14, 2006, one year passed since the dismissal of the post-conviction petition and,
presumably, Daniel's time to file a successive post-conviction petition expired."
On July 26, 2006, Daniel wrote to Payne about his concerns:

You were appointed to my Case over 4 months ago, Personally I feel my Case is
being neglected, In your May-24-2006 letter you wrote and told me the status of
my case was in Abeyance. 1was not very pleased with that letter, My case was
dismissed because of Rule 40(c) because of Mr. Kehne's lack of actived on my
Case for 6 months.

"ee Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 190, 177 P.3d 400,404 (Ct. App. 2008)
(successive petition must be filed within a reasonable amount of time).

Could you please write and tell me what is going on with my Case I feel like I'm
being left in the dark and don't have a clue what is going on.

...
Ex. Letter dated 7/26/06 (errors in original).
Payne responded by letter oil August 15,2006. She told Daniel that she had reviewed his
files and detelmined that he had no basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and so
had drafted an amended petition for his signature raising only the issue that his sentence was so
excessive as to violate the Eighth Amendment. Payne acknowledged some problems with the
petition, writing, "Technically, the Amended Petition is untimely; however, because your prior
counsel failed to file any amendment, I believe Judge Luster will permit us to amend the petition,
albeit late." She closed her letter by promising to contact Daniel when a hearing date was set so
that he could appear by telephone. Ex. Letter dated 8/15/06.
In a second letter a few days later, Payne explained why she refused to raise a claim of
ineffective assistance of couilsel. I11 the letter, she stated among other things that ". . . you have
the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that you would have been found not
guilty if your lawyer(s) hadn't screwed up. In your case Gust like most defendants), you
convicted yourself. . ." Ex. Letter dated 8/22/06 (emphasis original).' Payne also told Daniel
that "[flor you to prevail on your ineffective assistance claims, you must show how you would
have been fou11d not guilty if the favorable evidence from the police or prosecutor would have

Contra Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687-88 (1984); (To establish prejudice,
the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient
performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Proof by clear and convincing
evidence is not required.).

been pr~vided."~
And, then she instructed the indigent and imprisoned Daniel to investigate his
ow11 claims, including a claim that trial counsel had operated under a conflict of interest telling
him that he needed among other things "proof that Mr. Adams told your lawyers to do or not do
something in your case to cause you to be found guilty." She concluded, "Unless you provide me
with facts (not feelings or thoughts or accusations) that indicate there is some merit to your
argument, I will not pursue ineffective assistance of counsel claims." Id.
That same day, August 22, 2006, Payne filed an amended petition raising only the issue
that Daniel's sentence (a fixed term of 25 years for first degree murder and 15 years for
conspiracy to commit robbery) was so "grossly disproportionate, cruel and unusual" as to violate
the Eighth Amendment. CR 127.
Payne did file Daniel's pro se affidavit with the amended petition. In the affidavit, Daniel
stated that it was his understanding that her petition would supplement but not replace his and
that he still wanted to raise the issues that the government withheld favorable evidence and that
he had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. CR 129. She also included a second pro
se affidavit in which Daniel stated that there was an actual conflict of interest because his counsel
and a co-defendant's counsel worked in the same office and that in the preliminary hearing, a
state's detective admitted to destroying a drawing and two or t h e e pages of notes and that there

' Contra Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87 (1963) (Suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment.); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,434 (1995). (A
showing of materiality under Brady "does not require demonstration by a preponderance that
disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant's
acquittal." Id. "The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have
received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial,
understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." Id.

may have been other evidence destroyed. CR 131

Ln response to Payne's amended petition, the state filed a notice of objection and denial
"based on the fact that this above captioned case has been dismissed per order of the court
entered 6-14-05." CR 133
Payne responded to this by filing a motion for summary disposition and amended notice
of hearing. Payne did not mention the dismissed status of the case in her motion, rather, she
argued that because Daniel was only an aider and abettor and not the person who actually
performed murder, his sentence, which exceeded that of the co-defendants, violated the Eighth
Amendment. CR 134.
Throughout this period, Payne wrote several times to Daniel reassuring hiill that a hearing
date was soon to be set or had been set in the case. She never mentioned that the case had long
ago been dismissed. Ex. Letters dated 10/10/06, 12/21/06, 1/30/07,2116/07,2/28/07,3/26/07
In the meantime, Payle became frustrated with Daniel. On April 3,2007, she wrote lo
him:

I am not required to do everything that you want me to do. I am required to work
within the bounds of the law. 1 am doing so. 1will not rehash what I have
previously told you because you don't like the answer.
I do not expect you to understand since you cannot understand that you are guilty
of murder. You were foolish to take this matter to trial to begin with because you
let the judge hear all of the evidence. A man was beaten to death with a baseball
bat by your cohorts, and you did nothing to stop it. In fact, yon lured people away
and kept them away so the robbery could be committed. This was a horrific
crime. You helped hide the body. It is not my fault you were convicted of
murder, nor is it my fault that you were given 25 years fixed. Thank your lucky
stars you didn't get life without parole.
The ONLY possible issue you have relates to the fixed portion of your sentence.
Quite franltly, even if your fixed portion were to be reduced, you wouldn't make

parole because you refuse to take responsibility for your actions. Grow up and
stop whining.

I'm moving to withdraw froin your case. You will receive a copy ofthe motion
and notice.
Ex. Lelter dated 4/3\07 (emphasis original).
And, on April 9, 2007, l'ayne filed her motion to withdraw stating that the attorney-client
relationship had been irreparably damaged and that Daniel lacked confidence in her so that she
could no longer represent him. CR 146
This same day, inexplicably, Payne apparently finally realized that Daniel's case had long
ago been dismissed and decided to file, along with the motion to withdraw, a motion to set aside
the dismissal pursuant to Civil Rule 40(c). The motion states:

Prior counsel failed to show good cause for retention of this matter pursuant to
IRCP 40(c). When counsel is appointed, the party represented has the right to
effective assistance of counsel. Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685, 905 P.2d 86
(1995). Failure to diligently pursue a claim such that it is dismissed constitutes
if the party is prejudiced by the dismissal. Id. In
ineffective assistance of cou~~sel,
this case, Mr. Eby has a viable 8Ih amendment grossly disproportionate post
conviction claim, though Mr. Eby and Ms. Payne disagree on the remainder of the
original claims. Dismissal when a viable claim exists constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel.
If this matter remains dismissed, then Mr. Eby will file an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim on prior post collviction counsel, and he will likely be appointed
counsel to help him on that matter. 'The 81h amendment claim is a viable one, and
it should be heard and decided by the Court. Judicial efficiency and economy
constitute good cause and support setting aside the inactivity dismissal.

CR 148.
Payne never referred to the prior pro se documents Daniel long ago filed in an attempt to

move the Court to reverse its order dismissing the case.
Finally, on April 17, 2007, a hearing was held wherein Payne represented Daniel. Daniel
was not present, but participated by telephone. Tr. 2.
The Court elected to hear the motion to set aside the entry of dismissal and the motion for
summary disposition prior to Payne's motion to withdraw. Tr. 3.
In her opening statements on the motion, Payne first gave an inconect recitation of the
procedural background of the case stating that there had been just two Rule 40 notices, that
Kehne had responded to both, but that the Court had dismissed the case anyway. She then
explained to the Court that it was only after she had filed the amended petition that she spoke
with the prosecutor who explained to her that the case had long ago been dismissed. She then
reiterated her argument that if this case is not reinstated Daniel can filed a new post conviction
claiming ineffective assistance on the part of Kel~.ne,and so it would be most efficient to just
reinstate this case because there is the viable Eighth Amendment claim. Tr. 4-6.
When the Court questioned Payne regarding its authority to set aside the Rule 40
dismissal, she referred to Rule 60, but made no immediate argument as to what the rule states or
how it might apply to the case because she did not have her rule book with her. Tr. 7.
The state argued that the Court was without jurisdiction to reinstate the case pursuant to
Castle v. Hays, 131 Idaho 373,957 P.2d 351 (1998). The state asserted that under Castle, Daniel
was limited to filing either an appeal within 42 days of dismissal or a motion to reconsider within
14 days. Tr. 9.
The state also pointed out that even if Daniel might have a valid claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel against Kehne, the time for filing any successive post conviction petition

had long since passed. Tr. 12.

Ln response, Payne, who had by now secured a copy of Rule 60, pointed out that under
Rule 60 she needed to file a motion no later than one year after dismissal, but by her own
calculations, she did not do so. "The motion that I filed was way past the one year point, Your
Honor, so it seems to me that no matter how you look at it, I didn't file the paperwork timely."
Next, Payne stated that since she was appointed in November 2005, she could have filed a timely
Rule 60 motion within the first month of her appointment, but she failed to do so. She then
offered that Castle should not apply to this case because it was a civil case and ". . .this isn't only
a civil case, this is a criminal case where my client's liberty and freedom is at issue." Then,
apparently ignoring the state's argument that any subsequent post conviction petition would be
untimely, Payne argued that if the Court did not reinstate this case, Daniel would have to file an
ineffective assistance of counsel on her ". . . and we'll go through this all again, which may be
the absolute appropriate way to handle it." Tr. 14-15,
The Court then adjourned for a short recess. When proceedings resumed, Payne finally
alerted the Court that Daniel had filed his pro se pleadings seelting reinstatement of the case just
a month and a half after the case was dismissed and that her pleadings were "really somewhat
duplicative of that motion, and it was timely filed. We are within the six months or within the
one year under Rule 60(b)." Tr. 16.
The Court ultiinately denied the motion to set aside the entry of dismissal. CR 150. In so
doing, the Court reviewed the procedural l~istoryof the case. With reference to Daniel's timely
pro se motion to set aside the dismissal, the Court stated:
The Court could legally construe that what Mr. Eby filed was a Motion to

Reconsider the court Rule 40(c) dismissal, back on the 16"' of September of 2005,
based upon the Court's ruling on June 14Ihof 2005.
Ti. 21.
The Court then held that Castle does apply because post-conviction proceedings are
governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure and that pursuant to Castle relief from a Rule 40(c)
dismissal is limited to a motion to reconsider filed within 14 days or a notice of appeal filed
within 42 days. Tr. 21-22. With regard to Rule 60(b), the Court stated that it did not know if it
was in a position to consider the application under that rule, but that even if it could, it had not
received any satisfactory showing to justify setting aside the order of dismissal. Tr. 23.
Wben Daniel pointed out that he did not get notice of the dismissal of his case until
August 19, 2005, the Court said, " . . . I don't dispute that, and I recognize your plight there, but
the Rules of Civil Procedure govern the proceeding and my clerk gave notice by fax to [Kebne] .
. ." Tr. 25.

This appeal timely followed. CR 154.
111. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Did the District Court err in failing to set aside the order of dismissal?
2. On rernand, should new competent counsel be appointed?
IV. ARGUMENT

A. The District Court Erred in Failing to set Aside the Order of Dismissal
Pursuant to Daniel's Pro Se Rule 60(b) Motion.
The District Court denied the motion to set aside the order of dismissal because it
believed that Castle v. Hays, supra, limited the means of seeking relief from a dismissal under
lRCP 40(c) to only a motion for reconsideration under IRCP 1l(a)(2)(B) filed within 14 days of

the order of dismissal or a notice of appeal filed within 42 days. The Court further found that
even if Daniel's pro se motion to set aside the dismissal could be considered as a motion under
IRCP 6O(b) for relief from a final judgment, that there had not been a satisfactory showing to
support a grant of relief.
This detennination was erroneous for two reasons. First, Castle does not limit relief in
this case to only motions under IRCP 1l(a)(2)(B) or direct appeal. And, second, Daniel did
make a satisfactory showing for a grant of relief under IRCP 60(b).
Castle does not foreclose relief under IRCP 60(b) in this case because Castle did not
consider the applicability of IRCP 6O(b) and does not hold that IRCP 60(b) is without meaning or
effect when a case is dismissed under IRCP 40( c).
In Castle, the case was dismissed pursuant to IRCP 40( c) and the plaintiff filed a
"motion to reinstate" seventy-seven days later. The Castle opinion does not set out the reasons
offered by plaintiffs to support reinstatement nor does the opinion give any indication as to which
e
relied upon in making the motion. 131 Idaho at 373-4, 957 P.2d at 352-353.
civil ~ u l plaintiffs
Rather, the opinion states that relief from an IRCP 40(c) dismissal is limited and cites two
avenues of relief, a motion to reconsider under IRCP 1l(a)(2)(B) and a direct appeal and holds
that the motion to reinstate was not timely under either of these niles. The opinion does not state
that IRCP 1l(a)(2)(B) and direct appeal are the only means of relief and the opinion does not
state that IRCP 60(b) which governs motions for relief from a final judgment cannot be applied
to IRCP 40(c) dismissals. In fact, the opinion does not even mention R C P 60(b) leaving open
only the conclusion that the Court was not considering the application of that rule.
Insofar as the District Court's refusal to set aside the dismissal in this case was premised

OH

a belief that Castle holds that relief from an IRCP 40( c) dismissal is not available under IRCP

6O(b), it is erroneous and must be reversed. Daniel's pro se motion was a timely motion for
relief from the final order dismissing his case under IRCP 60(b), and as will be d~scusscdbelow,
his motioil was supported by sufficient reason and should have been granted. Therefore, he now
asks this Court to reverse the District Court order denying him relief and remand the case with
instructions to set aside the dismissal and appoint new competent counsel to represent him

In the alternative, if Castle is read to prohibit motions under IRCP 60(b) after a case has
been dismissed under IRCP 40(c), then Castle conflicts with the civil rules and should be
overruled
IRCP 40(c) provides:
( c) Dismissal of Inactive Cases. In the absence of a showing of good cause for

retention, any action, appeal or proceeding, except for guardianships,
conservatorships, and probate proceedings, in which no action has been taken or
in which the summons has not been issued and served, for a period of six (6)
months shall be dismissed. Dismissal pursuant to this rule in the case of appeals
shall be with prejudice and as to all other matters such dismissal shall be without
prejudice. At least 14 days prior to such dismissal, the clerk shall give
notification of the pending dismissal to all attorneys of record, and to any party
appearing on that party's own behalf, in the action or proceeding subject to
dismissal under this rule.
Dismissal of a case is a final order. Marshall v. Enns, 39 Idaho 744,230 P.46 (1924), as
cited in Castle v. Hays, 131 Idaho at 374, 957 P.2d at 352
Rule GO(b) provides:

(b) Mistakes, Inadvertence, Excusable Neglect, Newly Discovered Evidence,
Fraud, Grounds for Relief From Judgment on Order. On motion and
pursuant to such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (I) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in

time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, OK a prior judgment upon which it is based has beer1
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable
time, and for reasons (I), (2), and (3) not more than six (6) months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
Such motion does not require leave from the Supreme Court, or the district court,
as the case may be, as though the judgment has been affirmed or settled upon
appeal to that court. This rule does not limit the power of a court to: (I) entertain
an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding, or
(ii) to set aside, as provided by law, within one (1) year after judgment was
entered, a judgment obtained against a party who was not personally served with
summons and complaint either in the state of Idaho or in any other jurisdiction,
and who has failed to appear in said action, or (iii) to set aside a judgment for
fraud upon the court.
As the reader can see, Rule 60(b) is not limited by its terms so as to be inapplicable to
orders of dismissal under Rule 40(c), and Rule 40(c) does not itself prohibit motions under Rule
60(b). Any such limitation imposed by Castle is contrary to the rules as written and is not
supported by any other case law
Indeed; Castle includes another obvious error. Castle slates first that a11 order of
dismissal under Rule 40(c) is a final judgment. Then it states, that a litigant may seek relief from
a Rule 40(c) dismissal under IRCP l l(a)(2)(B). However, IRCP 11 (a)(2)(B) applies only to
iilterlocutory orders and orders made after entry of the final judgment, hut not to final judgments.

(B) Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration of ally
interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at any time before entry of
final judgment but not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final
judgment. A motion for reconsideration of any order of the trial court made after
entry of final judgment may be filed within fourteen (14) days from the entry of
such order; provided, there shall be no motion for reconsideration of an order of
the trial court entered on any motion filed under Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a),

57(e), 59.1,60(a), or 6O(b).
IRCP 1l(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). This rule, by its own language applies only to interlocutory
orders and "any order of the trial court made after entry of final judgment." Thus, it does not
apply to final orders dismissing cases.

Castle contradicts the clear language of the rules insofar as it holds that relief from a final
order dismissing a case may be obtained via a motion filed under IRCP 11(a)(2)(B) and may not
he obtained via a motion filed under IRCP 60(b). This creates a nonsensical situation where
litigants and attorneys wishing to contest orders of dismissal must violate the language of not just
one, but two rules, IRCP 1 l and 60, in order to obtain relief from dismissal. If this Court is
inclined to read Cnstle as precluding review of orders of dismissal under Rule 40(c), then Castle
should now be overruled to avoid the confusing and absurd result of having case law directly
contradict the clear language of the civil rules. See, State v. Bethvieser, 143 Idaho 482, 586, 149
P.3d 857, 861 (Ct. App. 2006), stating that where the statutory language (in this case, the
language of the civil rules) is unambiguous it must be given effect.
In either event, whether this Court holds that Castle does not preclude Rule 60(b) motions
and remains good law, or whether this Court holds that Castle does preclude Rule 60(b) motions
and must be overruled, Daniel's pro se motion for relief from dismissal first sent to the trial court
on the date he finally received word that his case had been dismissed, and then resent to the clerk
of the court less than three weelcs later, was timely under Rule 60(b).

In addressing the possibility that a timely Rule 60(b) motion had been made, the District
Court stated that, even if Castle did not exist and it could consider a Rule 60(b) motion, it had
not received a satisfactoly showing that it should set aside the dismissal. Even as the Court was

making this statement, it acltnowledged that Daniel himself had been blameless in the situation
leading to the dismissal of his case:
The Court: 1can ce~lainlypass on Mr. [Kelme's] representation here, that
certainly may have been deficient and untimely, but I don't think that sympathy
for Mr. Eby's plight really trumps the case holding or application under the Rules
of Civil Procedure in this case.

Daniel Eby: Your Honor, when you're talking about entering an order Notice of
Dismissal of my case on August lGth, 2005, it was attached to my brief and I
didn't know if it had been dismissed until 1 got notice froin the clerk of your court
until August 19Ih,2005.
The Court: I made sure to made a record of that, Mr. Eby, and I don't dispute that,
and I recognize your plight there, but the Rules of Civil Procedure govern the
proceeding, and my clerk gave notice by fax to the attorney [ofl record on the day
the dismissal was entered, and that was the 14"' of June, and that would be the
controlling date of the notice.
The fact that your attorney didn't notiEy you or you didn't get a copy of the
proceedings until later, I don't think impacts the application of the rule under the
circumstances, because I think it was Mr. [Kehne's] obligation to respond if he
felt I should not have dismissed it because he needed to give me some more
infonnation, he should have made that application within 14 days or simply filed
an appeal after that point, and neither of those things occurred, and I have to run
from those dates.
The fact that you didn't [get] notice until later certainly creates some problems for
you, but does not change the application for the rules, but I will make sure we
made notice of that.
Tr. 23-26.
Earlier, the Court noted that Daniel's first appointed attorney had failed to work on his
case, perhaps because the attorney had gotten into trouble with the Bar. Daniel's second attorney
allowed the case to be dismissed for inaction through no wrong behavior on Daniel's part. In
fact, the state Supreme Court finally suspended Kehne from the practice of law for a year based

upon his actiou/inaction in this and other cases. And, finally, his third attorney's actions ill the
case speak for theinselves. Payne, who could have filed a timely Rule 60(b) motion or
successive post-conviction petition at the time of her appointment, could not even figure out that
the case had been dismissed until she had been representing Daniel for 11 months and even then,
because she could not figure out the case's status on her own, she had to have the prosecuting
attollley explain it to her. She then sent Daniel personally abusive letters which, in addition,
contained misinformation about what needed to be proved to establish Strickland and Brady
claims. In short, Daniel had three different appointed attorneys and not one of them managed to
meet his or her professional obligations by filing a timely amended petition or other available
pleading.
Daniel's post-conviction was dismissed for inactivity only because of the complete failure
of appointed counsel to provide competent representation. This is a more than sufficient reason
to justify relief from the dismissal. IRCP 60(b)(6). To hold otherwise would be to deny Daniel
any sort of due process. Const. Art. I,

S 13, U.S. Const. Amend. 5 and 14.

"Due process

demands an opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' Gray v,
Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 182, 116 S.Ct. 2074,2090, 135 L.Ed.2d 457,482 (1996)." State v.
Bettwieser, 143 Idaho at 588, 149 P.3d at 863. See also, McGloon v. Gwynn, 140 Idaho 727,
729, 100 P.3d 621,623 (2004) ("The right to procedural due process guaranteed under both the
Idaho and United States Constitutions requires that a person involved in the judicial process he
given meaningful notice and a meaningful opportullily to be heard.").
Daniel's pro se motion for relief from the order dismissing his case was a timely motion
under Rule 60(b). Relief should have been granted because, through no fault of his own, Daniel

was denied due process by the repeat failures of appointed counsel to present his case to the
District Court in a timely manner. For t h ~ reason,
s
he asks this Court to reverse the order
dismissing his case and to remand for appointment of new counsel and the filing, at last, of a
proper and timely amended petition.

B. Upon Remand, the District
Comn~etentCounsel.

oust Should be Ordered to Appoint New

Daniel is also requesting that upon remand this Coult specifically order that the District
Court appoint new competent counsel to represent him. I.C. 5 19-4904 authorizes the
appointment of counsel to represent indigent post-conviction relief applicants. And, while there
is no constitutional right to an attorney in a state post-conviction proceeding so that a petitioner
cannot claim ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings, Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho
894,902, 908 P.2d 590, 595 (Ct. App. 1995), it seems obvious that the re-appointment of
demonstrated by Payne would be a denial
counsel who has been guilty of the gross deficie~~cies
of Daniel's right to due process. With Payne in control of his representation, it is impossible to
have any confidence that Daniel will be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Thus, given
Payne's obvious antipathy toward Daniel and her lack of familiarity with basic precepts of
constitutional law and post-conviction procedure, different counsel should be appointed upon
remand.
IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Daniel requests that this Court reverse the order denying
his motion for relief from the order dismissing his case and further reverse the order dismissing
the case. He also requests that this Court order the District Court to appoint new counsel upon

was denied due process by the repeat failures of appointed counsel to present his case to the
District Court in a timely manner. For this reason, he asks this Court to reverse the order
dismissing his case and to remand for appointment of new co&sel and the filing, at last, of a
proper and timely amendedpetition.

B. Upon Remand, the District Court Should be Ordered to Avpoint New
Competent Counsel.
Daniel is also requesting that upon remand this Court specifically order that the District
Court appoint new competent counsel lo represent him. I.C.

5 19-4904 authorizes the

appointment of counsel to represent indigent post-conviction relief applicants. And, while there
is no constitutional right to an attorney in a state post-conviction proceeding so that a petitioner
cannot claim ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings, Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho
894, 902,908 P.2d 590, 595 (Ct. App. 1995), it seems obvious that the re-appointment of
counsel who has been guilty of the gross deficiencies demonstrated by Payne would be a denial
ofDaniel's right to due process. With Payne in control of his representation, it is impossible to
have any confidence that Daniel will be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Thus, given
Payne's obvious antipathy toward Daniel and her lack of familiarity with basic precepts of
constitutional law and post-conviction procedure, different counsel should be appointed upon
remand.

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Daniel requests that this Court reverse the order denying
his motion for relief from the order dismissing his case and further reverse the order dismissing
the case. He also requests that this Court order the District Court to appoint new coui~selupon

remand so that new competent counsel can finally file an amended petition as appropriate
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